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タカハシ トモヤ
Takahashi,Tomoya
高橋 知也 所属 経済学部 経済学科 職種 教授 |
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| 言語種別 | 英語 |
| 発行・発表の年月 | 2026/03 |
| 形態種別 | 学術雑誌 |
| 標題 | Tariffs on Vertically Differentiated Platforms in Two-Sided Markets |
| 執筆形態 | 単著 |
| 掲載誌名 | SSRN |
| 掲載区分 | 国外 |
| 出版社・発行元 | ELSEVIER |
| 担当区分 | 筆頭著者,最終著者 |
| 概要 | This paper develops a minimal international-trade extension of a standard model of com-
petition between vertically differentiated platforms in a two-sided market. Building on Zennyo (2016), we preserve the sequential structure of the game (royalties first, device prices second) and the developer entry mechanism. We introduce a per-unit tariffon the imported (high-quality) device and derive a closed-form subgame-perfect equilibrium. We find that, despite asymmetric qualities and a trade-policy wedge, equilibrium royalties remain symmetric and perfectly tariff- invariant. The tariffshifts both consumer demand and software variety toward the domestic (low-quality) platform. Furthermore, we provide explicit optimal-tariff formulas under both strategic-trade and full domestic welfare objectives. |